Problem wolnej woli z perspektywy nauk empirycznych


Abstrakt:

The goal of the article is to analyze the concept of free will from philosophical point of view and in the context of empirical hypotheses that are supposed to be related to this concept. At the beginning of the paper, however, the problem of free will (PFW) is characterized as, first and foremost, a philosophical problem, necessarily related with the concept of determinism. The following part of the paper deals with (PFW) in the thought of Aristotle, St. Augustine, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. One detail, present in the contemporary philosophical discussion concerning (PFW) is chosen from the thought of each of the aforementioned philosophers. The last part of the article is a critical analysis of three empirical hypotheses related with (PFW): Eccles’ psychons, Libet’s free will as a veto for action, and Wegner’s free will as an illusion. It is claimed that these hypotheses are, at best, weakly justified, and certainly do not solve (PFW).